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ABSTRACT
We analyze the setting of monetary and nonmonetary policies in monetary unions. We show that
in these unions a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free-rider
problem in the setting of nonmonetary policies, such as labor market policy, ﬁscal policy, and bank
regulation. The free-rider problem leads the union’s members to pursue lax nonmonetary policies
that induce the monetary authority to generate high inﬂation. The free-rider problem can be mit-
igated by imposing constraints on the nonmonetary policies, like unionwide rules on labor market
policy, debt constraints on members’ ﬁscal policy, and unionwide regulation of banks. When there
is no time inconsistency problem, there is no free-rider problem, and constraints on nonmonetary
policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful.
∗The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Since the 1990s, interest has grown in the design of monetary unions–groups of po-
litical units (countries or states or provinces) that have a great deal of independence in
setting ﬁscal and other nonmonetary policies, but that share a central monetary authority,
an independent entity which sets a single monetary policy for all the members of the union.
In practice, some monetary unions have worked poorly while others have worked well. Ar-
gentina is an example of an unsuccessful one; the United States, a successful one; and the
jury is still out on the European Union. Why are some monetary unions successful and
others not? Here we develop a theory that answers this question.
The time inconsistency problem in monetary policy is at the heart of our theory. We
argue that under some circumstances, this monetary policy problem leads to a novel type
of free-rider problem in the setting of nonmonetary policies by union members. Free-riding
union members pursue lax nonmonetary policies that beneﬁt themselves individually, but
that induce the monetary authority to pursue policies that generate high inﬂation for the
whole union.
One way to eliminate both problems is to directly solve the time inconsistency problem
in monetary policy. As is well-known, in theory, at least, this problem can be solved by
imposing commitment or reputational mechanisms on the monetary authority. When either
type of mechanism is in place, there is no free-rider problem, so that directly solving the time
inconsistency problem indirectly solves the free-rider problem too. In practice, of course, it
is diﬃcult to change the degree of eﬀective commitment, say, by developing a reputation.
For our purposes, we will simply assume as necessary that a monetary authority either has
or does not have a time inconsistency problem.
More interestingly, we show that solving a monetary union’s free-rider problem helps
mitigate its time inconsistency problem in monetary policy. The free-rider problem can be
solved by imposing unionwide constraints on nonmonetary policies, such as rules on labor
market policies, debt constraints on ﬁscal policy, and regulation of banks. When unionmembers’ nonmonetary policy options are limited, the monetary authority is less likely to
be induced to act in ways that increase inﬂation. The constraints thus do not necessarily
eliminate the time inconsistency problem, but they do at least reduce it.
We ﬁrst make these points in a general theoretical setup. Our model has governments
that set nonmonetary policies noncooperatively, private agents that behave competitively,
and a benevolent monetary authority that chooses the inﬂation rate. The monetary author-
ity’s optimal inﬂation rate depends on the decisions of private agents and on the individual
governments’ nonmonetary policies. Private agents make their decisions anticipating the
choice of the monetary authority. Governments choose their nonmonetary policies anticipat-
ing the choices of both private agents and the monetary authority.
In our setup, the free-rider problem is quite diﬀerent from that in the existing literature.
In the standard formulation of the free-rider problem, decision makers are directly linked;
the actions of each decision maker directly aﬀect the payoﬀs of others. Our setup has no such
direct links. Here the nonmonetary policy of each government aﬀects the common inﬂation
rate and thus indirectly aﬀects the payoﬀs of other governments. This indirect link does not,
however, suﬃce to generate a free-rider problem. We use an envelope argument to prove
that.
Here the source of the free-rider problem is, rather, the behavior of forward-looking
private agents when the monetary authority cannot commit to a policy. Without such
commitment, a change in nonmonetary policy by one of the union’s member governments
induces the private agents to predict a change in unionwide inﬂation, and this predicted
change induces them to change their decisions. Because each government cares about the
decisions of its own private agents, a change in nonmonetary policy by any member govern-
ment aﬀects the welfare of them all. This indirect link results in a free-rider problem. With
commitment by the monetary authority, there is no free rider problem even if the model has
forward-looking private agents.
3To highlight the role of private agents in generating the free-rider problem, we start by
considering a monetary union without them, that is, with only governments and a monetary
authority. We show that in this environment, as long as the monetary authority is benevolent,
there is no free-rider problem.
After detailing the theory, with as well as without private agents, we consider applica-
tions to three common types of nonmonetary policies: labor market policy, ﬁscal policy, and
bank regulation.
We ﬁrst apply our theory to labor market policy. T od os o ,w em o d i f yt h ec l a s s i c
model of time inconsistency in monetary policy (due to Kydland and Prescott 1977 and
Barro and Gordon 1983). In our modiﬁcation of this classic model, governments of countries
in a monetary union determine the natural rate of unemployment by their setting of labor
market policies. We show that with this setup, the free-rider problem leads governments
to adopt policies that result in excessively high unemployment and inﬂation. Constraints
on these labor market policies eliminate the free-rider problem and help mitigate the time
inconsistency problem.
We then apply our theory to ﬁscal policy. We consider a simple dynamic model with
many countries united in a monetary union. Each country’s ﬁscal authority ﬁnances govern-
ment spending by issuing nominal debt to its residents. After that, the union’s monetary
authority decides on the common inﬂation rate. The monetary authority balances inﬂation’s
beneﬁts against its costs. Higher inﬂation has beneﬁts because it reduces the real value of
nominal debt and thus reduces the amount of distortionary taxes that must be raised by each
country’s government in order to repay the debt. Higher inﬂation also has costs because it
distorts allocations and thus reduces output. In our model, as the debt rises, the beneﬁts of
inﬂation rise more than the costs. Hence, the larger the debt that the monetary authority
inherits, the higher it sets the inﬂation rate.
In deciding on its level of government spending, each country’s ﬁscal authority balances
4the gains from government spending against the costs of future distortions, including the
induced costs of higher inﬂation on its own output–ignoring inﬂation’s costs on the output
of other countries. Thus, relative to a cooperative benchmark, each ﬁscal authority issues
too much debt, which leads the monetary authority to create too much inﬂation, which in
turn leads to an ineﬃciently low level of output for all countries in the union.
In principle, if the monetary authority can somehow eﬀectively commit to its policy,
then ﬁscal authorities have no incentive to issue too much debt, and the union has no free-
rider problem. In practice, though, such commitment is often not available, and monetary
unions have typically chosen to attack the free-rider problem directly. One way of doing so is
to impose constraints on the amount of debt that governments of union members can issue.
In our example, appropriately chosen constraints solve the free-rider problem.
Finally, we apply our theory to bank regulation. We develop a simple dynamic bank-
ing model with many countries united in a monetary union. Each country’s government
regulates the riskiness of its banks’ portfolios. When banks cannot fully pay oﬀ depositors,
the monetary authority prints money to pay the residual amount, thus increasing inﬂation.
Each country’s government thus balances the costs of regulation intended to reduce bank
riskiness against the induced costs of inﬂation resulting from bank bailouts. In doing so,
each government ignores the induced inﬂation costs on other countries in the union. These
forces also generate a free-rider problem in which, compared with eﬃcient levels, regulation
of banks is lax, bank bailouts are too frequent, and the rate of inﬂation is excessive. If no
mechanism is available to solve the time inconsistency problem directly, then the free-rider
problem in this model can be mitigated with mutually agreed upon bank regulation.
Our general analysis and the three applications suggest an answer to our original
question, Why are some monetary unions successful and others not? A monetary union is
likely to fail when it has a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy and no eﬀective
constraints on the nonmonetary policies of its members.
5Consider some examples of actual monetary unions. Argentina has experienced high
and volatile inﬂation rates. Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi (2000), Cooper and Kempf
(2001a, b), Tommasi, Saiegh, and Sanguinetti (2001), and Nicolini et al. (2002) have ar-
gued that the nonmonetary policies have not been eﬀectively constrained by the central
government and that the central bank has routinely bailed out the provincial governments.
Argentina seems to be an example of a monetary union which has a serious time inconsistency
problem with its monetary policy and which is unable to constrain the nonmonetary policies
of its provinces. In this sense, the poor performance of the monetary union in Argentina is
consistent with our theory.
The United States has experienced much lower and less volatile inﬂation rates than
many other monetary unions. The independence of the Federal Reserve System apparently
reduces the time inconsistency problem in monetary policy and thereby insulates the mone-
tary authority from pressures of state governments. In this sense, the good performance of
the monetary union in the United States is also consistent with our theory.
Our theory suggests that the success of the European Monetary Union is not yet
assured. The charter of the European Central Bank was explicitly designed to make it
independent in order to help it overcome time inconsistency problems. If the central bank is
able to overcome these problems the European Monetary Union will be successful. Even if
the central bank is not able to overcome these problems, the Union may still be successful if it
enforces the constraints on nonmonetary policies in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability
and Growth Pact. The worrisome scenario is that the central bank will not be able to resist
pressures to inﬂate and the Union will be unwilling to enforce its constraints on nonmonetary
policies.
In this context, it is worth noting that our theory predicts that when constraints that
enforce cooperative outcomes are agreed to by governments ex ante, each government has a
strong incentive to violate these constraints ex post. In practice, the European Union has
6experienced signiﬁcant diﬃculty in enforcing constraints on the ﬁscal policies of its member
countries. The observation that some member countries desire to violate the terms of the
treaty does not, by itself, imply that the treaty was poorly designed. This desire is exactly
what our theory predicts would occur with a well-designed treaty.
The behavior of other monetary unions is consistent with our theory as well. Von Hagen
and Eichengreen (1996) ﬁnd that 37 of the 49 countries they study impose restrictions on
the ﬁscal policies of their subcentral governments. Such restrictions are consistent with a
concern by central governments that they have not successfully solved the time inconsistency
problem in monetary policy.
Our work here generalizes and expands the analysis of our earlier work, Chari and
Kehoe (2007). Here we lay out a general framework for analyzing free-rider problems in
monetary unions and apply it to three types of nonmonetary policies. Our second applied
example here is related to the analysis in the earlier work. There we assume that governments
borrow from lenders who live outside the monetary union in order to smooth consumption
over time. The union’s monetary authority uses inﬂa t i o na saw a yt ol e v yat a xo nt h en o m i -
nal debt holdings of these outside lenders. Here we assume instead that governments ﬁnance
their spending by borrowing from their own residents and repay the debt with distorting
taxes. The monetary authority uses inﬂation here as a way to reduce the real value of that
debt and, hence, the required tax distortions.
Our work here is also related to a literature on ﬁscal policy in monetary unions, includ-
ing the work of Giovannini and Spaventa (1991), Sibert (1992), Dixit and Lambertini (2001),
Uhlig (2002), and especially Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) and Cooper and Kempf (2001, 2004).
Beetsma and Uhlig, however, focus on a monetary union’s ability to discipline political econ-
omy problems among its union members, problems our monetary union does not have. Here
the free-rider problem arises solely because of a time inconsistency problem. Cooper and
Kempf, meanwhile, do focus on a free-rider problem, but not one like ours, that arises from
7time inconsistency. Indeed, Cooper and Kempf emphasize that their free-rider problem dis-
appears when the union’s monetary policy is to maximize the welfare of the residents of the
union members.
The gains from setting ﬁscal policy cooperatively across countries have been discussed
extensively and are well-understood. Such cooperation has been shown to be desirable if
countries’ ﬁscal policies aﬀect world prices and real interest rates (Chari and Kehoe 1990,
Canzoneri and Diba 1991). That kind of cooperation, however, is not especially related to
countries being in a monetary union. We thus here abstract from the issues it raises by
assuming that the policies of the countries joined in a monetary union do not aﬀect world
prices and real interest rates.
An extensive literature has discussed the gains from setting ﬁscal policy cooperatively
across countries have been discussed extensively and are well-understood. Such cooperation
has been shown to be desirable if countries’ ﬁscal policies aﬀect world prices and real interest
rates (Chari and Kehoe 1990, Canzoneri and Diba 1991). That kind of cooperation, however,
is not related uniquely to countries being in a monetary union. We thus abstract from the
issues it raises by assuming that the policies of the countries joined in a monetary union do
not aﬀect world prices and real interest rates.
1. THEORY
1.1 Without Private Agents
One of our principal contributions is to highlight the subtle source of free-rider problems
in environments with benevolent governments and a benevolent monetary authority: the
behavior of forward-looking private agents. In order to set the stage for our analysis, we
begin with a simple setup without private agents. In this environment, at ﬁrst glance, there
appears to be a free-rider problem, but closer examination reveals that there is none.
Consider a world economy with N countries indexed i =1 ,...,N u n i t e di nam o n e t a r y
union, with one monetary authority that chooses unionwide monetary policy. The govern-
8ment of country i chooses a nonmonetary policy τi, and the monetary authority of the union
chooses a common inﬂation rate for the union, denoted π. The payoﬀ (or welfare) from these
choices to the government of country i is
V (τi,π). (1)
Consider ﬁrst an environment in which inﬂation π is some arbitrary function of non-
monetary policies: π(¯ τ),w h e r e¯ τ =( τ1,...,τN). If governments choose their nonmonetary
policies simultaneously and noncooperatively, then the ﬁrst-order condition for nonmonetary





Here and throughout Vτ and Vπ denote the derivatives of V (τi,π). (This is our standard
notation for derivatives.) Here and throughout we also consider cooperative equilibria in
which the nonmonetary policies are chosen to maximize the sum of all government payoﬀs
(or all the countries’ welfare). We view these cooperative equilibria as benchmarks for
welfare that we use to judge the eﬃciency of the noncooperative equilibria, rather than as a
description of how governments make decisions. Here the cooperative nonmonetary policies
maximize
PN
i=1 V (τi,π), so that, imposing symmetry, we see that the ﬁrst-order condition





The ﬁrst-order conditions (2) and (3) look just like those we would see in classic free-rider
problems. An example is the sharing-the-bill problem, in which N individuals dine at a
restaurant, each orders τi, and they share the bill equally, so that π(¯ τ)=
PN
i=1 τi/N. Clearly,
in this situation, each individual free-rides oﬀ the other diners since, at the margin, each
individual enjoys all the beneﬁts of extra food but pays only 1/Nth of the cost.
This result might seem to suggest that free-riding problems arise in monetary unions
from the same sources as in classic problems. Closer examination reveals, however, that there
9is no free-riding in the environment described above, as long as the monetary authority is
benevolent.
To see this, assume that the monetary authority is benevolent in that it maximizes the
sum of the payoﬀst ot h eg o v e r n m e n t s
PN
i=1 V (τi,π). Suppose that the monetary authority
chooses inﬂation after each government chooses its nonmonetary policy τi.T h e nπ(¯ τ) is no




In a symmetric equilibrium, (4) implies that Vπ =0 . Using this result, we see that here there
is no free-rider problem because the ﬁrst-order conditions (2) and (3) coincide. Obviously,
this result does not depend on the timing of actions.
Thus, in this environment, with a benevolent monetary authority, a monetary union
has no free-riding problem. In practice, of course, monetary unions are plagued with such
problems. Their problems arise from a source that is not captured in the simple environment
just described–from the behavior of private agents, from which we have abstracted. As we
shall see, adding private agents to the environment adds a time inconsistency problem in
monetary policy that leads to a free-rider problem in nonmonetary policy.
1.2. With Private Agents
We now introduce private agents into the monetary union setup just described. We
then make explicit the logic by which a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads
to a free-rider problem in nonmonetary policy.
Consider extending the setup with just a union of governments and a monetary au-
thority to include in each country a continuum of private agents indexed j ∈ [0,1], each
of whom chooses an action zij. Let xi =
R
zij dj denote the aggregate choice of actions by
private agents in country i. In this extension, the payoﬀs to private agents from these choices
are
V (τi,z ij,x i,π), (5)
10where, as before, τi denotes nonmonetary policy by the government of country i and π
denotes the common inﬂation rate.
The payoﬀ to the government of an individual country i is the integral of the payoﬀs
to the private agents in that country,
Z
V (τi,z ij,x i,π) dj, (6)
whereas the payoﬀ to the union’s monetary authority is the sum of the payoﬀst oa l lt h e




V (τi,z ij,x i,π) dj. (7)
Notice that we have assumed that the nonmonetary policies of individual governments
do not directly aﬀect the payoﬀs to other governments; thus, the only way governments
in this union interact is through the eﬀect of their actions on the common inﬂation rate.
We make this assumption in order to abstract from standard nonmonetary policy linkages
across countries, like tariﬀs and taxes. Such linkages have been analyzed extensively in the
literature and have no obvious bearing on issues concerning a monetary union. (See, for
example, the work of Chari and Kehoe 1990.)
Typically, a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy arises when the monetary
authority cannot eﬀectively commit to an inﬂation policy. We will show that without ef-
fective commitment in a monetary union, the union has a free-rider problem, which leads
noncooperative outcomes to diﬀer from cooperative outcomes. We show that the union has
no such problem when the monetary authority can commit.
We formalize the lack of commitment that drives the time inconsistency problem in
a monetary union with a no commitment game that has the following timing. First the
governments choose τi, then private agents choose zij, and ﬁnally the monetary authority
chooses π. We focus on an equilibrium in which all private agents within a country choose
t h es a m ea c t i o n s ,s ot h a tzij = xi for all i and j.
11A noncooperative equilibrium of this game is given by nonmonetary policies ¯ τ =
(τ1,...,τN), private agent decision rules xi(¯ τ) that depend on those policies, and a mone-
tary policy function π(¯ τ,¯ x) that depends on both the nonmonetary policies ¯ τ and the private
agents’ decisions ¯ x =( x1,...,x N) such that (i) for all ¯ τ,¯ x, the policy π(τ,¯ x) maximizes the
monetary authority’s payoﬀ; (ii) for each private agent ij,f o ra l l¯ τ, xi(¯ τ) solves
max
zij
V(τi,z ij,x i(¯ τ),π(¯ τ,¯ x(¯ τ))),( 8 )
where ¯ x(¯ τ)=(x1(¯ τ),...,x N(¯ τ)); (iii) for each government i, given the nonmonetary policies
of the other governments i0, the private agents’ decision rules xi, and the monetary authority’s
policy rule π, the policy τi maximizes the payoﬀ to government i.
A cooperative equilibrium of this game is deﬁned similarly, with (iii) replaced by this:
(iii0) given the private agents’ decision rules xi and the monetary authority’s policy rule π,
the vector ¯ τ maximizes the sum of the payoﬀst ot h eg o v e r n m e n t s . (Notice that conditions
(i), (iii), and (iii0) require that the relevant policies be best responses, whereas condition
(ii) has a ﬁxed-point problem built into it.)
Throughout, we focus on symmetric equilibria, in which in addition to all private agents
within a country choosing the same decision (zij = xi all i,j), all governments in the union
c h o o s et h es a m ep o l i c y(τi = τj all i,j). We characterize the equilibria by working backward.
Given nonmonetary policies ¯ τ and private agent decisions ¯ x, the monetary authority chooses




Vπ(τi,x i,x i,π)=0 , (9)
which in a symmetric equilibrium is simply Vπ =0 .
Each private agent maximizes (5), taking as given the nonmonetary policies ¯ τ, other
private agents’ decisions ¯ x, and the monetary policy function π(¯ τ,¯ x). The resulting best
response function Xi(τi,x i,π(¯ τ,¯ x)) satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
Vz(τi,z ij,x i,π)=0 . (10)
12Let ¯ x(¯ τ)= (x1(¯ τ),...,x N(¯ τ)) denote the ﬁxed point of the best response function, that is,
xi(¯ τ)=Xi(τi,x i(¯ τ),π(¯ τ,¯ x(¯ τ))) for all i. (11)
In a noncooperative equilibrium, the government of country i maximizes V(τi,x i(¯ τ),
xi(¯ τ),π(¯ τ)).L e tΠ(¯ τ)=π(¯ τ,¯ x(¯ τ)) denote the monetary policy function π(¯ τ,¯ x) evaluated
at the private agent decision rules ¯ x(¯ τ). Then the government’s ﬁrst-order condition is







where ∂Π/∂τi = ∂π/∂τi +
PN
j=1(∂π/∂xj)(∂xj/∂τi). Notice that ∂Π/∂τi captures both the
direct eﬀects of changes in nonmonetary policy τi on inﬂation and the indirect eﬀects through
changes in private agents’ decisions.
In a cooperative equilibrium, the governments jointly choose τ to maximize
N X
i=1
V(τi,x i(¯ τ),x i(¯ τ),Π(¯ τ)).
Taking the ﬁrst-order conditions and then imposing symmetry gives














We can use these conditions to show the following:
Proposition 1 (Free-riding without commitment): Suppose that in a monetary union,
there is a unique cooperative equilibrium with Vx 6=0and ∂xj/∂τi 6=0for i 6= j. Then
the monetary union has a free-riding problem, in the sense that the noncooperative and
cooperative policies without commitment diﬀer, and the cooperative equilibrium has strictly
higher welfare than the noncooperative equilibrium. If either Vx =0or ∂xj/∂τi =0in the
cooperative equilibrium, then the monetary union has no free-riding problem, in the sense
that the two equilibria coincide.
Proof. Substituting the ﬁrst-order conditions for the monetary authority and the pri-
















⎦ =0 . (15)
Comparing (14) and (15), we see that the policies in the two equilibria are diﬀerent if and
only if both Vx 6=0and ∂xj/∂τi 6=0in the cooperative equilibrium. Since the governments
in a cooperative equilibrium could feasibly choose the noncooperative policies, the unique-
ness of the cooperative equilibrium implies that welfare is strictly higher in the cooperative
equilibrium whenever the two equilibria diﬀer. Q.E.D.







where Xjx is the derivative of the ﬁxed point of the best response function in (11) with respect
to xj. Notice that if the decisions of private agents do not depend on their predictions of
inﬂation, so that Xjπ =0 ,o ri ft h ei n ﬂation rate does not depend on the nonmonetary
policies, so that ∂Π/∂τj =0 ,t h e n∂xj/∂τi =0 , and there is no free-rider problem.
At a superﬁcial level, the free-rider problem seems to arise solely because inﬂation
confers a common cost on all the countries in the union, whereas an individual country’s
government cares only about the eﬀect of inﬂa t i o no ni t so w np a y o ﬀs. The true source of the
free-rider problem is, however, subtler. For example, suppose that Vx =0 –say, because there
are no general equilibrium eﬀects from private agents. Then the two equilibria coincide even
though individual governments care only about the eﬀects of inﬂation on their own countries.
In this example, with Vx =0 , the two equilibria coincide because of an envelope argument.
In the cooperative equilibrium, the monetary authority chooses inﬂation to balance the costs
and beneﬁts, so that at the margin, an incremental change in inﬂation has no eﬀect on union
welfare. Starting at this outcome, a noncooperative government realizes that, at the margin,
the induced eﬀect of its policies on welfare through their eﬀect on inﬂation is zero. In both the
14cooperative and noncooperative equilibria, therefore, a government’s nonmonetary policies
at the margin aﬀect only that government’s welfare. Hence, there is no free-rider problem.
When Vx 6=0and ∂xj/∂τi 6=0 , however, there is a free-rider problem. Starting at the
cooperative outcome, we know that if the government of country i changes its nonmonetary
policies, then the monetary authority responds by changing the inﬂation rate. At the mar-
gin, if we neglect the induced eﬀects on private agent decisions x, then this change has no
eﬀect on welfare. The key is, however, that the induced change in the inﬂation rate does
induce changes in private agent decisions x. This is the channel which leads to the free-rider
problem. A change in the nonmonetary policy τi makes the private agents in all the countries
predict a change in inﬂation, and this predicted change makes them change their actions.
(Mechanically, we can see this from equation (16), which gives the change in private agent
decisions in country j due to changes in nonmonetary policy in country i. For this change
to be nonzero, we need ∂Π/∂τi 6=0and Xjπ 6=0 .)W h e nVx 6=0 , the change in private
agent decisions due to a predicted change in inﬂation implies that a change in nonmonetary
policy in country i induces a change in welfare in country j a n dt h u sl e a d st oaf r e e - r i d e r
problem. Later we will illustrate the detailed economic channels of the free-rider problem in
our application of this theory to three speciﬁc types of nonmonetary policies.
We now show that if the monetary union has no time inconsistency problem, then it
has no free-rider problem either. The union has no time inconsistency problem when its
monetary authority has some commitment or reputational mechanism. To demonstrate that
here, for simplicity, we just assume that the monetary authority can commit to its policies.
A similar analysis would apply to the reputational equilibria that support commitment in a
repeated game version of the model.
The timing in the commitment game is as follows. First the monetary authority chooses
π, then governments choose τi, and ﬁnally private agents choose xij.
A noncooperative equilibrium of this game is given by a monetary policy π, government
15nonmonetary policy functions τi(π), and private agent decision rules xi(π,¯ τ),s u c ht h a t(i)
for each private agent ij,a n df o ra l lπ and ¯ τ, xi(π,¯ τ) solves
max
zij
V(τi,z ij,x i(π,¯ τ),π); (17)
(ii) for each government i, for all π, given the nonmonetary policies of the other governments
τi0(π) and the private agent decision rules xi(π,¯ τ), the nonmonetary policy τi(π) maximizes
the payoﬀ to government i; and (iii) given the government nonmonetary policy functions
τi and the private agent decision rules xi, the monetary policy π maximizes the monetary
authority’s payoﬀ, or the union’s overall welfare.
A cooperative equilibrium of the commitment game is deﬁned similarly, but with (ii) re-
placed by this: (ii0) for all π, given the private agent decision rules xi(π,¯ τ), the nonmonetary
policy τi(π) maximizes the sum of the payoﬀst ot h eg o v e r n m e n t s .
We then have the following:
Proposition 2 (No free-riding with commitment): In a monetary union with com-
mitment, the noncooperative and cooperative policies coincide, and welfare in the resulting
equilibria is the same. Thus, with commitment, the union has no free-riding problem.
Proof. Consider private agent optimality. From (17) we know that the ﬁrst-order
condition for private agents in both equilibria is Vz =0and that xi(π,¯ τ) depends only on π




In the noncooperative equilibrium, the governments choose τi to maximize
V(τi,x i(π,¯ τ),x i(π,¯ τ),π).





16Acting cooperatively, the governments choose τi to maximize
N X
i=1
V(τi,x i(π,¯ τ),x i(π,¯ τ),π).
Using Vz =0and (18), we see that the ﬁrst-order condition for this problem reduces to (19).
Clearly, the noncooperative and cooperative equilibria coincide. Thus, with commitment,
there is no free-rider problem. Q.E.D.
The intuition for the diﬀering results in the environments with and without commit-
ment is as follows. In both environments, a government in a given country i does not care
directly about the nonmonetary policies or the private agent choices in any other country
j. Without commitment, however, nonmonetary policies in other countries induce changes
in the common inﬂation rate and thus changes in private agent choices in country i. This
linkage leads nonmonetary policies in country i to depend on nonmonetary policies in coun-
try j. This subtle linkage leads to a free-rider problem. With commitment, the links among
governments in diﬀerent countries are broken, and there is no free-rider problem.
Note that in our application to bank regulation, the monetary authority has essentially
a zero-one decision on whether to bail out banks that are in danger of insolvency. This feature
implies that, even though the monetary authority is maximizing, it does not set Vπ equal to
zero. Inspecting (12) and (13), we see that if Vπ∂Π/∂τi is not equal to zero, then an analog
of Proposition 1 typically applies. Proposition 2 holds as stated.
2. APPLICATIONS
Now we apply this general theory to some common examples of nonmonetary poli-
cies and show that in a monetary union, lack of commitment in monetary policy leads to
free-riding in nonmonetary policy. We also show that in such a situation, constraints on
nonmonetary policies are desirable.
172.1 Labor Market Policy
First we apply our theory to a type of nonmonetary policy that governments of members
of a monetary union control: labor market policy. For this application, we use the classic
model of time inconsistency in monetary policy due to Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Barro and Gordon (1983), in which ex post inﬂation reduces unemployment. We modify
this model to allow governments in a monetary union to set labor market policies that
determine the natural rate of unemployment in their own countries. We show that without
commitment, the free-rider problem leads governments to adopt policies that result in higher
unemployment and inﬂa t i o nt h a nw o u l do c c u ri na ne ﬃcient allocation. We also show
that constraints imposed on labor market policies eliminate the free-rider problem and help
mitigate but do not eliminate the time inconsistency problem.
Consider the following modiﬁed version of Kydland and Prescott’s and Barro and
Gordon’s model. In this example, the natural rate of unemployment in country i, ¯ u(τi), is
aﬀected by labor market policies in that country, denoted by τi. For simplicity, let ¯ u(τi)=
¯ u−τi. The realized unemployment rate ui is determined by the natural unemployment rate
and the log of the real wage xi − π, which is the diﬀerence between the log of the nominal
wage and the log of the price level. Since initial prices are given, π is both the price level
and the inﬂation rate. Speciﬁcally,
ui = xi − π +¯ u(τi). (20)
In this example, each private agent chooses a wage zij, and the wage in country i is
given by xi =
R




















where a, b,a n dc are constants. The ﬁrst term in this objective function provides a target real
wage for the private agents, the second and the third terms reﬂect concerns over aggregate
unemployment and inﬂation, and the last term captures the cost of altering labor market
18policies that aﬀect the natural rate of unemployment. Substituting for ui from (20) and
¯ u(τi)=¯ u − τi gives private agents these payoﬀs:


















The payoﬀ to government i is
R
V (τi,z ij,x i,π)di, and the payoﬀ to the union’s mon-
etary authority is the sum of the governments’ payoﬀs. These payoﬀ functions ensure that
p r i v a t ea g e n t sc h o o s et h e i rw a g e st ob et h ee x p e c t e dv a l u eo fi n ﬂation and that the mone-
tary authority cares about the average rate of unemployment. (To see why this assumption
matters, see the work of Chari, Kehoe, and Prescott 1989.) In much of the literature, the
payoﬀs to the private agents are given (implicitly) by the ﬁrst term on the right side of (22)
and the payoﬀs to the monetary authority, by the second and third terms. We choose to
combine these terms so that the governments and the monetary authority are benevolent.
Equilibria of the no commitment and commitment games in this example are deﬁned
exactly as in the theory section above. To show that the no commitment game has a free-rider
problem, we need show only that Vx 6=0and ∂xi(¯ τ)/∂τj 6=0in the cooperative equilibrium.




xi + Na¯ u − a
P
τi
N(1 + a + b)
. (23)
Next we note that the private agent’s ﬁrst-order condition yields xi = π. Clearly, xi is the
same for all i, a n dw ed e n o t ei tb yx. Then x(¯ τ) solves the ﬁxed-point problem x(¯ τ)=











Clearly, ∂xi(¯ τ)/∂τj = −a/bN 6=0as long as a 6=0 . To calculate the value of Vx, we need
to solve for the cooperative equilibrium policies. It is straightforward to use the monetary
authority’s ﬁrst-order condition to show that the cooperative equilibrium (C) labor market





19If ac¯ u 6=0 , we have that Vx 6=0 . From Proposition 1, the following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 3 (Free-riding in labor market policies without commitment): In the
game with no commitment, the monetary union has a free-rider problem, in the sense that
the noncooperative and cooperative equilibria diﬀer if ac¯ u 6=0 . If ac¯ u =0 , then the union
has no free-rider problem, in the sense that the two equilibria coincide.
If ac¯ u =0 , then the monetary union has no time inconsistency problem in monetary
policy. This condition is related to similar conditions in the literature that follows Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). In that literature, ¯ u is a constant,
and there is only one country. A standard result in the literature is that there is no time
inconsistency problem if a =0or if ¯ u =0 , that is, if the monetary authority does not have an
incentive to reduce unemployment below the natural rate. In our model, in which the natural
rate can be aﬀected by labor market policies, if c =0 , then each government would simply
set its policies so that the natural rate is zero, and there would be no time inconsistency
problem in monetary policy. Thus, Proposition 3 essentially says that whenever there is a
time inconsistency problem in monetary policy, there is a free-rider problem in labor market
policy.











Clearly, the noncooperative rate of inﬂation πN is greater than the corresponding cooperative
rate πC. Notice that the noncooperative inﬂation rate rises monotonically with the number
of countries. In this sense, the free-rider problem gets worse as the number of countries gets
larger.
20The free-rider problem can be eliminated by imposing constraints on the labor market
policies of the union’s member governments. The following corollary is immediate.
Corollary to Proposition 3 (Labor market policy constraints and the free-rider
problem): In a monetary union without commitment, if each government is required to set
its labor market policy τi ≥ τC, then the union has no free-rider problem, in the sense that
the noncooperative equilibrium attains the same levels as the cooperative equilibrium.
Another way to interpret this corollary is as follows. Consider the problem of designing
the constraints on labor market policy in the symmetric noncooperative equilibrium in order
to reach the highest attainable level of welfare. Inspection of the cooperative problem makes
clear that the highest attainable level of welfare is the level in the cooperative equilibrium. In
the noncooperative equilibrium, this level of welfare can be reached by setting the constraint
τi ≥ τC.
Clearly, Proposition 2 applies to this application of our theory to labor market pol-
icy, and thus with commitment, there is no free-rider problem. Under commitment, the
cooperative rate of inﬂation is zero.
Notice that the constraints on labor market policy that eliminate the free-rider problem
in labor market policy also help mitigate the time inconsistency problem in monetary policy
because they lower inﬂation from πN to πC. They do not, however, eliminate the time
inconsistency problem: πC is still positive and thus higher than the cooperative rate of
inﬂation with commitment, which is zero.
Note that the time inconsistency problem arises even if the monetary union consists of
a single country. As is well-known, welfare is often lower without commitment in monetary
policy than with such commitment. The labor market constraints discussed here obviously
cannot solve the time inconsistency problem. All these constraints do is help solve the free-
rider problem by reproducing the outcomes that would occur if the monetary union consisted
of a single country. In this sense, even though the free-rider problem arises because there
21is a time inconsistency problem, solving the free-rider problem does not eliminate the time
inconsistency problem.
2.2 Fiscal Policy
Now we apply our theory to a second type of nonmonetary policy: ﬁscal policy.W e
assume here that each of the many governments in the monetary union issues nominal debt
to their residents in order to spend and smooth consumption over time. The union’s single
monetary authority chooses a common inﬂation rate. This inﬂation reduces the real return
on debt and eﬀectively serves as a kind of partial default on it. We show that when the
monetary authority cannot eﬀectively commit to its monetary policy, the union has a free-
rider problem: governments issue too much debt, inﬂation is too high, and output is too
low relative to the cooperative levels. This free-rider problem can be solved by imposing
constraints on the amount of debt that governments can issue. Such constraints lead to the
cooperative levels of inﬂation and output.
We also show that if the monetary authority can commit to its policies, constraints on
ﬁscal policy are unnecessary and possibly harmful. From this perspective, critics of these
constraints, such as Buiter, Corsetti, and Roubini. (1993) must be implicitly assuming that
the monetary authority can overcome its time inconsistency problem.
Consider a two-period model with N identical countries indexed i =1 ,...,N united
in a monetary union. The preferences of consumer j in country i are given by
U(c0ij)+V (gi)+βU(c1ij),
where c0ij and c1ij denote private consumption in the two periods, gi is government con-
sumption in period 0; U(ctij) for t =0 ,1 is the utility from private consumption; β is the
discount factor; and V (gi) is the utility from government consumption. We normalize the
price level in period 0 to be 1 and let π denote the unionwide gross inﬂation rate between
periods 0 and 1. We model monetary policy as the choice of the price level that produces
each period’s inﬂation rate π.
22In each country i, output in period 0 is a constant ω, while output in period 1 is y(π,Ti),
where Ti denotes real tax revenues in period 1. We assume that y(π,Ti) is decreasing in both
π and T;b o t hi n ﬂation and taxes distort decisions and therefore reduce output. We assume
that consumers have access to a linear savings technology with exogenous gross return 1+r.
This assumption ensures that real interest rates are unaﬀected by policy.
Consider next the budget constraints of the governments and the consumers. For
simplicity, assume that government consumption gi is ﬁnanced entirely by debt issued to
country i consumers in period 0 and paid for by distortionary taxation of those consumers
in period 1.I np e r i o d0, the government of each country i issues to consumers claims to Bi
units of currency payable in period 1. Let 1+R denote the nominal interest rate on this










in period 1.L e tkij denote the amount that consumers save in the storage technology and dij,
the amount that they save by holding government debt. The budget constraints of consumer
j in country i are then
c0ij = ω − kij − dij
and




We consider symmetric allocations across consumers in a given country so that, for
all j, dij = di, kij = ki,c 0ij = c0i,a n dc1ij = c1i. In such symmetric allocation, each
consumer pays di = Bi/(1 + R) for claims to debt in period 0 and receives a repayment
(including interest) of Bi in period 1. We assume throughout that ω is suﬃciently small so
23that consumers choose to save. That is, we assume that the equilibrium is interior, in the
sense that both ki and di are positive. Let total debt ¯ d =( d1,...,d N) and total repayments
made ¯ B =( B1,...,B N) summarize the debt contracts.
The timing of this model without commitment is as follows. In period 0,t h eg o v e r n -
ments choose their promised repayments Bi. Consumers then choose how much to save in
the storage technology kij and how much nominal debt to hold dij. In period 1, the mone-
tary authority chooses the common inﬂation rate π as a function of the promised nominal
repayments ¯ B a n dt h es a v e da m o u n t s¯ k =( k1,...,k N). Finally, the governments choose real
tax revenues Ti to satisfy their budget constraints.
To set up the equilibrium, we work back from the end of period 1.A tt h a tp o i n t ,g i v e n
π and Bi, a government chooses to raise tax revenues to satisfy Ti = Bi/π. At the beginning


















In (29) we have integrated the consumers’ budget constraints in period 1, used the govern-
ment’s period 1 budget constraint to cancel terms, and then dropped irrelevant terms, such













where yπi and yTi denote the partial derivatives of y(π,Bi/π) with respect to the ﬁrst and
second arguments. Let π(¯ x, ¯ k) denote the resulting monetary policy rule.
Now consider the decisions of the consumers. These consumers have two ways to
save: by holding nominal debt and by using the storage technology. Clearly, in any interior









24a n di sr e f e r r e dt oa st h eﬁrst-order condition for saving.
Finally, consider the decision of government i at the beginning of period 0. It is conve-
nient to formulate the government’s problem as a Ramsey problem in which the government
chooses both the debt and the decisions of consumers subject to the consumers’ ﬁrst-order
conditions. In the noncooperative equilibrium, the government of country i,t a k i n go t h e r


















π( ¯ B,¯ k),
Bi





subject to the ﬁrst-order condition for consumer savings (31), where we have used the budget
constraints of the consumers and the government to substitute out variables.
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subject to the ﬁrst-order condition for consumer savings (31) in each country.
A noncooperative equilibrium here is a monetary policy rule π( ¯ B,¯ k) that solves (29)
and allocations ( ¯ BN,¯ kN) that solve (32). A cooperative equilibrium is a monetary policy rule
π( ¯ B,¯ k) that solves (29) and allocations ( ¯ BC,¯ kC) that solve (34).
While this setup can be mapped into the language of the general theory section, for
convenience, we analyze the noncooperative and cooperative equilibria directly. We begin
with a simple lemma that simpliﬁes this analysis.
Lemma 1. In a symmetric noncooperative equilibrium, the solution to the government’s
problem (32) coincides with the solution to a relaxed version of that problem in which the
25ﬁrst-order condition for consumer savings in each country is dropped as a constraint. A
similar result holds for the symmetric cooperative equilibrium.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we ﬁr s ts h o wt h a ta ta n ys y m m e t r i ca l l o c a t i o ni nt h e
symmetric equilibrium,
∂π( ¯ B,¯ k)
∂ki
=0 . (35)
We can compute this derivative by diﬀerentiating the monetary authority’s ﬁrst-order con-
dition (30), which deﬁnes π( ¯ B,¯ k). This ﬁrst-order condition, with the optimal value π( ¯ B,¯ k)








c1i( ¯ B,¯ k)
´"
yπi(π( ¯ B,¯ k)),
Bi
π( ¯ B,¯ k)
−
Bi
π( ¯ B,¯ k)2yTi(π( ¯ B,¯ k)),
Bi
π( ¯ B,¯ k)
#
=0 ,(36)
where c1i( ¯ B,¯ k) is short-hand notation for the right side of (28) evaluated at π( ¯ B,¯ k). Taking
the derivative of (36) and using the fact that at a symmetric allocation (30) holds, we see
that (36) reduces to
yπi −
Bi
π2yTi =0 . (37)
Since the optimal π does not vary with ki, (35) follows.
Now consider the ﬁrst-order condition for ki in the lemma’s relaxed problem. Using




But this implies that the solution to the relaxed problem is also feasible for the government’s
original problem. Similar logic applies in the symmetric cooperative equilibrium. Q.E.D.
From the lemma, (37), and the consumers’ ﬁrst-order condition (38), we know that the


























The ﬁrst-order condition for storage in both of these equilibria is simply (38).
The following proposition is then immediate:
Proposition 4 (Free-riding in ﬁscal policies without commitment): A monetary union
with no commitment has a free-rider problem, in the sense that the noncooperative and
cooperative equilibria diﬀer, and the cooperative equilibrium has strictly higher welfare than
the noncooperative equilibrium.
The free-rider problem can be eliminated by imposing constraints on the debt policies
of the union’s member governments. To see this, consider trying to support the coopera-
tive allocations as noncooperative allocations subject to an upper limit on debt repayments
Bi ≤ BC. We establish our result by showing that under suﬃcient conditions, the increment
to welfare of a marginal increase in debt is positive at the cooperative allocations. This
result implies that for a noncooperative government, the debt constraint will bind at those
allocations. To see that, note that the left side of (39) is the increment to welfare under a
noncooperative government from an increase in debt. When evaluated at the cooperative











Letting η =( B/π)(∂π/∂B) denote the elasticity of nominal debt with respect to inﬂation
when evaluated at the cooperative equilibrium allocations, we have this corollary.
Corollary to Proposition 4 (Debt constraints and the free-rider problem): In a
monetary union without commitment, if 0 <η<1/N and each government is required to
set its debt repayments Bi ≤ BC, then the union has no free-rider problem, in the sense that
the noncooperative equilibrium attains the same levels as the cooperative equilibrium.
27Proof. We need to show that the increment to welfare in (41) is positive when the
elasticity satisﬁes 0 <η<1/N. To do so, rewrite (40) as
[V (g) − U
0(c0)](1 − Nη)+U
0(c0)yT =0 . (42)




which, since η>0, implies that (41) is positive. Q.E.D.
It is easy to show that if y(π,T) is linear in its arguments, then η =( 1 /2)N,w h i c h
obviously satisﬁes the condition in the corollary 0 <η<1/N.
This corollary can be interpreted in another way. Consider the problem of designing
the constraints on ﬁscal policy in the symmetric noncooperative equilibrium in order to reach
the highest attainable level of welfare. Inspection of the cooperative problem makes it clear
that the highest attainable level of welfare is the level in the cooperative equilibrium. In
the noncooperative equilibrium, this welfare level can be reached by setting the constraint
Bi ≤ BC.
We now show that the analog of Proposition 2 applies to our ﬁscal policy applica-
tion. That is, when a monetary authority can commit, the cooperative and noncooperative
equilibria coincide; hence, binding constraints on future debt issues can only reduce welfare.
To show this, we make one change in the timing of the model to allow for commitment
by the monetary authority. Instead of waiting until period 1, the monetary authority chooses
the inﬂation rate π ﬁrst, at the start of period 0. Then the governments choose their promised
repayments Bi, and consumers choose how much to store kij and how much nominal debt
to hold dij. In period 1, ﬁnally, the governments choose real tax revenues Ti to satisfy their
budget constraints.


























subject to the ﬁrst-order condition for consumer savings. The analogous problem in the

























s u b j e c ta l s ot ot h eﬁrst-order condition for consumer savings. By inspection, we know that
the solutions to these two problems are identical, and Proposition 2 holds, so that in a
monetary union with commitment, the noncooperative and cooperative policies coincide,
and welfare in the resulting equilibria is the same. Thus, with commitment, the union has
no free-riding problem.
Propositions 2 and 4 imply that a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy is
at the heart of a free-rider problem in ﬁscal policy. They also imply that the question of
whether debt constraints are desirable is intimately connected to the extent to which the
monetary authority can commit to monetary policy. From Proposition 4 and the above
discussion, we know that if such commitment is not possible, then appropriately chosen debt
constraints raise welfare, whereas if such commitment is possible, then debt constraints can
only reduce it.
The monetary union with commitment is broadly similar to the economies studied in
an extensive literature that has discussed the gains from international cooperation in setting
ﬁscal policy. (See, for example, the work of Chari and Kehoe 1990 and Canzoneri and Diba
1991.) As noted in the introduction, this literature shows that cooperation is desirable if
a country’s ﬁscal policy aﬀects world real interest rates. In our ﬁscal policy application,
cooperation oﬀers no gains under commitment because we have eﬀectively assumed that the
monetary union is small in the world, in the sense that the world interest rate is independent
of the ﬁscal policy decisions of the union’s members. We have done so by having a linear
storage technology.
29However, suppose that we consider instead a model in which the real interest rate is
aﬀected by the decisions of the governments in the monetary union. In such a formula-
tion, even with commitment by the monetary authority, the noncooperative and cooperative
equilibria do not coincide. This is because any country’s spending decision aﬀects the world
interest rate and, hence, other countries’ welfare. Since these types of gains to cooperation
are not especially related to the formation of a monetary union, we abstract from them.
2.3 Bank Regulation
Now we apply our theory to a third type of nonmonetary policy: bank regulation.H e r e
the time inconsistency problem arises because the union’s monetary authority cannot commit
to not bailing out insolvent banks. Each country’s government policy consists of determining
the level of regulation of banks. Here the free-rider problem leads to lax regulation of banks,
frequent bank bailouts, and a high rate of inﬂation. The general argument in Propositions 1
and 2, that the time inconsistency problem leads to a free-rider problem, applies here, with
the modiﬁcations discussed at the end of the theory section. Here we see that unionwide
restrictions on bank regulation are desirable.
We assume that private agents’ funds deposited in banks are fully insured, banks have
limited liability, and the monetary authority bails out insolvent banks by printing money
to pay oﬀ their depositors. Deposit insurance, together with limited liability, creates an
incentive for banks to take on excessive risk. We assume that governments regulate banks to
limit risk-taking. In this application, the free-rider problem leads governments to regulate
too little and leads banks to take on too much risk compared to how they would behave in
the eﬃcient allocation.
The environment here is as follows. The monetary union consists of N countries indexed
i =1 ,...,N. The aggregate state of the union’s economy is s ∈ {H,L}, where H denotes
ab o o m( o rahigh state) and L denotes a recession (or a low state). The probabilities of
H and L are μH and μL, respectively, where μH + μL =1 . Output is produced as follows.
30Each country i has a large number of projects, indexed by zi ∈ [0,1/2]. A project of type
z yields a return R per unit of investment when it succeeds and 0 otherwise. A project’s
probability of success is pH(z)=( 1 /2) + z in a boom and pL(z)=( 1 /2) − z in a recession.
We will show that in each country i, o n l yo n et y p eo fp r o j e c t – s a y ,zi–will be chosen to
be ﬁnanced by the country’s banks. The total output in country i in state s ∈ {H,L} is
ps(zi)R. Notice that when projects with a higher value of z are chosen, the distribution of
output is a mean-preserving spread of the output when projects with a lower value of z are
chosen.
This monetary union has many banks. Each bank can ﬁnance up to one unit of
investment. Ab a n ki nc o u n t r yi obtains funds from depositors who are paid an interest
rate ri. Banks have limited liability, in that they must pay depositors only if bank receipts
exceed bank obligations. If bank receipts fall short of obligations, then banks pay zero, and
the monetary authority pays oﬀ the depositors by liquidating the bank’s assets and printing
money to cover any shortfall. The government of country i =1 ,...,N can do some costly
supervision at a level of τi and prohibit banks from ﬁnancing projects with z>τ i.T h i s
supervision of bank activities is what will represent bank regulation in this economy.
We now describe optimal behavior by banks for a given inﬂation rate π and given
supervision levels ¯ τ =( τ1,...,τN). A bank’s maximization problem is to choose which type
of project to fund. A bank in country i, taking as given the interest rate ri on its deposits
a n dt h eg o v e r n m e n ts u p e r v i s i o nl e v e lτi, chooses project type z to maximize proﬁts:
qHimax{pH(z)R − ri,0} + qLi max{pL(z)R − ri,0} (45)
subject to z ≤ τi. Here, qHi and qLi are the prices in country i for one unit of consumption
i nab o o ma n dar e c e s s i o n( s t a t eH and L), respectively.
For some given policies π and ¯ τ and state prices qsi, for i =1 ,...,N, s = H,L, a
competitive banking equilibrium consists of portfolio rules zi(τi) and deposit rates ri(τi) such
that (i) zi(τi) solves (45) given ri(τi) and (ii) proﬁts as deﬁn e di n( 4 5 )a r ez e r o .T h e nw e
31have the following:
Lemma 2. In a competitive banking equilibrium, zi(τi)=τi and ri = pH(zi(τi))R.
Proof. Since proﬁts are zero in equilibrium, each term in (45) is zero. We drop the i
subscript for simplicity. Since pH(z) ≥ pL(z), we know that r = pH(z)R and pL(z)R−r ≤ 0.
To see that the constraint z ≤ τ binds, suppose, by way of contradiction, that it doesn’t,
that in equilibrium z<τ .Then consider the problem of an individual bank. For this bank,
increasing z increases pH(z)R−r and, thus, increases the ﬁrst term in (45). The second term
is unchanged since max{pL(z)R − ri,0} is zero at the original value of z and increasing z
lowers pL(z)R−r; that is, the maximum value remains at zero. Thus, increasing z increases
proﬁts, which contradicts proﬁt maximization. Q.E.D.





where ysi denotes output in country i and πs denotes the common inﬂation rate across
countries, both in state s. We assume that private agents cannot share risk across countries,
so that each agent simply consumes the output of country i. W ea l s oa s s u m et h a tt h e
utility function is increasing in output and decreasing in the inﬂation rate. Output in each
country i is given by the returns from the banks’ projects less the costs of supervising
banks, e(τi), which is increasing in τi. From the lemma, we know that all banks in a given
country choose projects of the same type zi, so that total output in country i is given by
ys(zi,τi)=ps(zi)R − e(τi).
In this economy, the monetary authority is required to print money to bail out any
bank that cannot pay oﬀ its depositors, that is, when ri <p s(zi)R. An inﬂation rate of π
raises revenues of πM, where M is the union’s initial money stock, which we normalize to 1.
32Thus, the monetary authority must set π so that in each state s
πs(¯ r, ¯ z)=
X
i
max{ri − ps(zi)R,0}, (47)
where ¯ r =( r1,...,r N) and ¯ z =( z1,...,z N).





μsU(ys(zi(¯ τ),τi),πs(¯ r(¯ τ), ¯ z(¯ τ)))
along with a competitive banking equilibrium (¯ r(¯ τ), ¯ z(¯ τ)) and a monetary policy function
π that solves (47). A cooperative equilibrium is deﬁned similarly except that the vector of
supervision levels ¯ τ maximizes the sum of objective functions across countries.
The logic of the general setup discussed at the end of the theory section can be applied
to this bank regulation application. To see how, let xi be the vector (xir,x iz)=( ri,z i) and
π be the vector (πL,πH). To keep the notation simple, let the monetary authority either
bail out all insolvent banks, by setting πs = πs(¯ r,¯ z), or not bail out any insolvent bank, by
setting πs =0 . Let the indicator variable d =1if there is a bailout and d =0if not. Since
banks within each country all solve the same problem, we need only consider a representative
bank for each country. Hence, there is no zij in payoﬀs. Then the payoﬀ to a government of




μsU(ys(zi,τi),πs) if either ri ≤ ps(zi)R or d =1 ,
and otherwise V (τi,x i,π) equals an arbitrarily large negative number, say, −K.T h i sp a y o ﬀ
to the government coincides with the payoﬀ in (46) if either the banks in that country are
solvent or there is a bailout. The payoﬀ to the monetary authority is then
P
i V (τi,x i,π).
Since the cost of not bailing out insolvent banks is arbitrarily large, the optimal choice for
the monetary authority is to bail out all insolvent banks.
33Now consider applying the extension of Proposition 1 that we referred to at the end of































This uses the feature that here neither ri nor zi varies with τj. Since Vπ 6=0and ∂Π/∂τi 6=0 ,
policies under cooperation and noncooperation diﬀer. We have proven the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 5 (Free-riding in bank regulation without commitment): Without com-
mitment, the monetary union has a free-riding problem, in the sense that policies under
noncooperation and cooperation diﬀer.
The mechanism that leads to the free-rider problem here is as follows. When bank
supervision by a government slackens, banks under its supervision take on riskier portfolios,
and in a recession, the monetary authority must make larger bailouts. These larger bailouts
lead to higher inﬂation and lower welfare. In a noncooperative equilibrium, each government
trades oﬀ the gains from slacker supervision against the costs it bears from higher inﬂation.
In particular, each government ignores the costs on others of the higher inﬂation that its
actions induce. In a cooperative equilibrium, the gains from slacker supervision are traded oﬀ
against the costs that all bear from higher inﬂation. These trade-oﬀsl e a dt oh i g h e ri n ﬂation
and lower welfare in the noncooperative equilibrium.
One way to mitigate the free-rider problem with regard to this type of nonmonetary
policy is to have countries set a mutually agreed upon level of bank supervision. Here
that level should be the cooperative level. Finally, Proposition 2 holds as stated for this
34environment, so that when there is commitment by the monetary authority, there is no
free-rider problem.
3. CONCLUSION
We have shown that time inconsistency problems in monetary policy induce a novel
type of free-rider problem in nonmonetary policies within monetary unions. The source of the
free-rider problem is the behavior of private agents. We have demonstrated that the free-rider
problem can be solved, or at least mitigated, by setting constraints on nonmonetary policies.
When a union’s monetary authority cannot commit to its policies, such constraints lead to
better monetary as well as nonmonetary policies. With commitment, however, nonmonetary
policy constraints only impose costs.
Here we have also illustrated our theory by applying it to three common types of
nonmonetary policies available to governments of countries in a monetary union.
Altogether, our analysis helps explain the divergent experiences of monetary unions in
Europe and Latin America and pinpoints some ingredients essential for a successful union.
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